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CREATIVE AND RESPONSIVE ADVOCACY FOR
RECONCILIATION: THE APPLICATION OF GLADUE
PRINCIPLES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Andrew Flavelle Martin*
As a response to the estrangement and alienation of Indigenous peoples from the Canadian justice system, Gladue principles are central to reconciliation in sentencing and other
criminal law contexts. However, the role of
Gladue principles in administrative law more
broadly remains uncertain. In this paper, I argue that the factors underlying Indigenous
peoples’ estrangement and alienation from the
justice system indicate estrangement and alienation from the administrative state itself,
and thus Gladue principles appropriately apply
in administrative law contexts. Using the results of a comprehensive search of reported decisions by tribunals and by courts on judicial
review, I analyze the reasons given by administrative decision-makers and judges for applying
or declining to apply Gladue principles. I argue
based on this analysis that Gladue principles
will most clearly apply in decisions about a
penalty or a benefit for an Indigenous person,
and can also apply—albeit in a way that requires more creativity—where the decision is
about neither a penalty nor a benefit. On this
basis, I provide recommendations for counsel,
administrative decision-makers, judges, legislators, and executive authorities to better realize
the potential of Gladue principles.

*

En réponse à la disjonction et à l’aliénation des peuples autochtones du système judiciaire canadien, les principes de Gladue sont
essentiels à la réconciliation dans la détermination des peines et dans d’autres contextes de
droit criminel. Cependant, le rôle des principes
de Gladue dans le droit administratif plus généralement demeure incertain. Dans cet article,
j’avance que les facteurs qui sous-tendent la
disjonction et l’aliénation des peuples autochtones du système judiciaire dénotent au même
titre la disjonction et l’aliénation de ces peuples
de l’État administratif au sens large, et donc
que les principes de Gladue s’appliquent également et à juste titre au droit administratif.
En utilisant les résultats d’une recherche compréhensive des décisions rapportées par les tribunaux et par les cours du contrôle judiciaire,
j’analyse les raisons qu’énoncent les décideurs
administratifs et les juges du contrôle judiciaire
pour appliquer ou refuser d’appliquer les principes de Gladue. J’avance sur la base de cette
analyse que les principes de Gladue
s’appliqueront le plus clairement dans les décisions sur une pénalité ou sur un avantage pour
un autochtone, et qu’ils peuvent s’appliquer —
bien qu’ils nécessitent plus de créativité —
lorsque la décision ne concerne ni une pénalité
ni un avantage. Ainsi, je formule des recommandations pour des avocats, décideurs administratifs, juges, législateurs et autorités exécutives afin de mieux mettre à profit le potentiel
des principes de Gladue.
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Introduction
In the words of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada
(TRC), “[v]irtually all aspects of Canadian society may need to be reconsidered” to achieve reconciliation.1 While there is not an absolute consensus on the meaning of reconciliation, the TRC explains it as being “about
establishing and maintaining a mutually respectful relationship between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in this country.”2 In this article, I
focus on a discrete and narrow, yet important, reconsideration of administrative law and the place of Indigenous peoples in the Canadian administrative state. It is unavoidably true that “[r]econciliation will take some
time”3—but that is no excuse for inaction, as it is equally true that there
is no time to waste.
A central component of the work toward reconciliation will be ensuring that the Canadian justice system and the Canadian administrative
state acknowledge and incorporate the unique background and situation
of Indigenous peoples into all facets of decision-making. Put otherwise,
the colonial administrative state needs to demonstrate and explicitly apply its understanding and respect for the uniqueness of Indigenous peoples in all interactions with them.
In this article, I argue that Gladue principles constitute a powerful
and appropriate mechanism to do so. At their core, Gladue principles constitute a recognition of the legal impact of the unique history and circumstances of Indigenous peoples in Canada. It is for this reason that reconciliation will require—among many other changes—the proactive, purposive, and creative extension of Gladue principles across administrative
law.
In R v. Gladue and its successor case, R v. Ipeelee, the Supreme Court
of Canada recognized that the overincarceration of Indigenous people in
Canada constituted “a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system.”4
While Justices Cory and Iacobucci, writing for the Court in Gladue, did
not explicitly identify colonization as the root of the crisis, they did refer
to many of its impacts, including “poverty, substance abuse, lack of education, and the lack of employment opportunities for aboriginal people ... [as

1

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for
the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
of Canada (Winnipeg: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015) at vi
[TRC Final Report].

2

Ibid at 6.

3

Ibid at vi.

4

R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688 at para 64, 171 DLR (4th) 385 [Gladue]; R v Ipeelee, 2012
SCC 13 at para 58 [Ipeelee].
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well as] bias against aboriginal people.”5 The Court would correct this
omission in Ipeelee, directly connecting “the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to
translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course
higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples.”6 As later recognized
by the TRC, “[c]olonialism remains an ongoing process, shaping both the
structure and the quality of the relationship between the settlers and Indigenous peoples.”7
While the Court in Gladue recognized explicitly that “[t]here are many
aspects of this sad situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons”
and restricted itself to criminal sentencing, 8 the approach gave rise to
powerful, yet sometimes nebulous, “Gladue principles” that over time
would nonetheless be extended beyond that context. In criminal sentencing in particular, the Court in Gladue explained that section 718.2(e) of
the Criminal Code embraced: “(a) the unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing the particular Aboriginal
offender before the courts; and (b) the types of sentencing procedures and
sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender
because of his or her particular Aboriginal heritage or connection.”9 Put
more generally, Gladue requires judges “to pay particular attention to the
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders because those circumstances are
unique and different from those of non-Aboriginal offenders.” 10 In this
way, a careful, deliberate, and honest understanding of the circumstances
of Indigenous persons embodies, or at least facilitates, the respect described by the TRC as integral to reconciliation—but to limit this understanding to criminal sentencing would be woefully incomplete.

5

Gladue, supra note 4 at para 65.

6

Ipeelee, supra note 4 at para 60. See also Jonathan Rudin, “Looking Backward, Looking
Forward: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in R. v. Ipeelee” (2012) 57 SCLR 375
(“[t]he decision [in Ipeelee] goes beyond Gladue in its analysis, its acknowledgment of
the realities of colonialism and its strong defence of the need to sentence Aboriginal offenders differently” at 375).

7

TRC Final Report, supra note 1 at 45. For examples of recent Indigenous scholarship
on colonization relevant to a discussion of Gladue principles, see Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Gladue at Twenty: Gladue Principles in the Professional Discipline of Indigenous
Lawyers” (2020) 4:1 Lakehead LJ 20 at 20–21. See also note 160 and accompanying
text.

8

Gladue, supra note 4 at para 65.

9

Ipeelee, supra note 4 at para 59, citing Gladue, supra note 4 at para 66; Criminal Code,
RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.2(e).

10

Ipeelee, supra note 4 at para 59, citing Gladue, supra note 4 at para 37.
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The extension of Gladue principles beyond their origin in criminal
sentencing under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code has been slow and
far from steady, and has not achieved the aspirations of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Gladue.11 Some of these extensions have come in statute, specifically in: the Youth Criminal Justice Act,12 amendments to the
Code of Service Discipline within the National Defence Act,13 amendments
to the bail provisions of the Criminal Code14 and the Ontario Correctional
Services and Reintegration Act, 2018,15 and amendments to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.16 Most of these extensions, however,
11

Supra note 4.

12

SC 2002, c 1, s 38(2)(d).

13

An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make related and consequential
amendments to other Acts, SC 2019, c 15, s 63(23), adding subsection c.1 to s 203.3 of
the Code of Service Discipline, being Part III of the National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c
N-5. Prior to this amendment, Gladue principles were applied notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory direction in R v Levi-Gould, 2016 CM 4003 at para 13.

14

Supra note 9, s 493.2, as added by An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts,
SC 2019, c 25 (“In making a decision under this Part [Part XVI], a peace officer, justice
or judge shall give particular attention to the circumstances of (a) Aboriginal accused;
and (b) accused who belong to a vulnerable population that is overrepresented in the
criminal justice system and that is disadvantaged in obtaining release under this
Part”, s 210). Prior to these amendments there was significant but not uniform case
law applying Gladue principles to bail. See e.g. R v Robinson, 2009 ONCA 205 at paras
13–15; R v Hope, 2016 ONCA 648 at paras 9–12; R v Oakes, 2015 ABCA 178 at
para 11; R v Louie, 2019 BCCA 257 at para 35. For an earlier application, see e.g. R v
Wesley, 2002 BCPC 717 at para 7. Contrast those decisions with R v Sacobie, [2001]
247 NBR (2d) 94 at para 8, [2004] NBJ No 511 (QB); R v Heathen, 2018 SKPC 29 at
paras 12, 47; R v Jaypoody, 2018 NUCJ 36 especially at paras 92–93.

15

Correctional Services and Reintegration Act, 2018, being Schedule 2 to Correctional
Services Transformation Act, 2018, SO 2018, c 6 [as of the time of writing, this Act is
not yet in force] (“The Minister and any person employed in the administration of this
Act shall, (a) consider systemic and individual circumstances for First Nations, Inuit or
Métis individuals under community supervision and inmates; and (b) when making a
decision to limit the liberties of a First Nations, Inuit or Métis individual under community supervision or inmate, consider the individual’s unique needs and circumstances, including the impacts of individual, systemic, cultural and historical factors, and
take into account culturally appropriate sanctions and options”, s 29).

16

SC 1992, c 20, s 79.1(1), as added by An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional
Release Act and another Act, SC 2019, c 27, s 23:
In making decisions under this Act affecting an Indigenous offender, the
[Correctional Service of Canada] shall take the following into consideration:
(a) systemic and background factors affecting Indigenous peoples of Canada;
(b) systemic and background factors that have contributed to the overrepresentation of Indigenous persons in the criminal justice system and that may
have contributed to the offender’s involvement in the criminal justice system; and (c) the Indigenous culture and identity of the offender, including his
or her family and adoption history.
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have come from decisions of courts in contexts ranging from extradition17
to civil contempt,18 the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), 19 the stay of
charges under section 24(1) of the Charter,20 the voluntariness of admissions to police,21 the withdrawal of a guilty plea,22 and relief from notice
periods in tort claims.23 Extensions of Gladue principles to administrative
law contexts have been relatively rare, but they have been invoked in cases of professional discipline24 and parole.25
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Canadian courts and the Canadian legal
literature have largely failed to explain, or even vigorously grapple with,
the role and scope of Gladue principles in administrative law generally.
There is an extensive literature on Gladue as it relates to specific matters
surrounding criminal law, focused on but not limited to sentencing.26 But

See also ibid, ss 4(g), 80–84, as discussed in Ewert v Canada, 2018 SCC 30 at
paras 57–58.
17

See United States of America v Leonard, 2012 ONCA 622 [Leonard]. But see R v Anderson, 2014 SCC 41 at paras 26–28, which narrowed the scope of Leonard.

18

See Frontenac Ventures Corp v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation, 2008 ONCA 534
[Frontenac Ventures].

19

See R v Dreaver, 2013 SKPC 220 at para 34; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. While Gladue principles have also been applied to an application for a stay for delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, in that case they were to
deny the stay (see R v Anugaa, 2018 NUCJ 2 at paras 42–48).

20

See R v Capay, 2019 ONSC 535.

21

See R v Camille, 2018 BCSC 301 (“[Gladue] reminds us that courts must take account
of different cultural values and experiences that may shape the world views of indigenous people and their responses as individuals in the criminal justice system” at para 78).

22

See R v Ceballo, 2019 ONCJ 612 at paras 10, 12.

23

See O’Shea v Vancouver (City), 2015 BCPC 398 at paras 100–101.

24

See Law Society of Upper Canada v Terence John Robinson, 2013 ONLSAP 0018 [Robinson].

25

See Twins v Canada (AG), 2016 FC 537. Contrast that case with John v National Parole Board, 2011 BCCA 188 at para 43, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34309 (1 December 2011). For the applicability of Gladue principles in a judicial screening of an
application for a reduction in parole ineligibility, see R v Poitras, 2012 ONSC 5147 at
paras 28–31; R v Purdy, 2020 BCSC 231 at paras 30–31. Contrast Purdy with R v
Abram, 2019 ONSC 3383 at paras 16–31.

26

See e.g. Jillian Rogin, “Gladue and Bail: The Pre-Trial Sentencing of Aboriginal People
in Canada” (2017) 95:2 Can Bar Rev 325; Judge ME Turpel-Lafond, “Sentencing Within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural Implications of R. v. Gladue” (2000) 43:1
Crim LQ 34.

THE APPLICATION OF GLADUE PRINCIPLES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 343

there is little, if any, conceptual consideration of Gladue principles in administrative law more broadly.27
I have argued elsewhere that Gladue principles should apply whenever the alienation and estrangement of Indigenous peoples from the Canadian justice system, including but not limited to the criminal justice system, is relevant.28 My argument was based on a synthesis of appellate decisions, primarily from the Ontario Court of Appeal, extending Gladue
principles to new contexts, while acknowledging apparent pushback on
those extensions by the Supreme Court of Canada.29 Under my approach,
the relevance of Gladue principles in administrative law was dependent
on how closely a given decision is connected to the justice system. Thus,
for example, I argued that Gladue principles are relevant in the professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers because lawyers are integrally
connected to the justice system and Indigenous lawyers exhibit, yet also
mediate or ameliorate, the estrangement from the justice system that
Gladue principles address. In focusing on the legal profession and its connection to the justice system, I did not consider the administrative law
context of professional discipline generally as determinative or even relevant. Under my analysis, Gladue principles were relevant not because
any particular decision was an administrative one, but because the disciplinary action took place in a context of estrangement and alienation from
the justice system. Under that approach, for example, Gladue principles
would not be relevant to professional discipline of an Indigenous health
professional, unless that professional was being disciplined for an interaction with the justice system—such as a criminal offence in the course of
their practice.
On further reflection, my previous analysis was effective on its own
terms but limited—indeed, arbitrarily limited—by the implicit assumption that Indigenous alienation and estrangement from the colonial Canadian justice system could be differentiated or disentangled from Indigenous alienation and estrangement from the likewise colonial Canadian
administrative state.

27

Existing scholarship at the intersection of Aboriginal law and administrative law focuses instead on the duty to consult. See e.g. Robin M Junger & Nika Robinson, “Administrative Law Remedies in the Aboriginal Law Context” (2012) 25:1 Can J Admin L
& Prac 55; Janna Promislow, “Irreconcilable?: The Duty to Consult and Administrative
Decision Makers” (2013) 26:3 Can J Admin L & Prac 251. But see Martin, supra note 7
(for discussion of the application of Gladue principles in another administrative law
context: lawyers’ discipline).

28

See Martin, supra note 7.

29

See especially R v Anderson, supra note 17 cited in Martin, supra note 7 at 42–43; R v
Kokopenace, 2015 SCC 28 [Kokopenace], cited in Martin, supra note 7 at 39–42.

344

(2020) 66:2 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL

Here, I make the more comprehensive claim that Indigenous peoples
are likewise estranged and alienated from the colonial Canadian administrative state itself.30 Under this broadened approach, I argue that Gladue
principles are potentially relevant to any administrative law decision.
This is not to say that administrative law cannot be consistent with Indigenous experiences and values, or that there cannot be an Indigenous
administrative law.31 Instead, my premise is that the Canadian administrative state is a colonial one from which Indigenous peoples are estranged and alienated.32
In this article, I build on the existing literature, including my own
work, by proposing an account of the appropriate role and scope for
Gladue principles in administrative law. I do so based on a comprehensive search of reported decisions by tribunals and by courts on judicial review. I argue that Gladue principles are potentially relevant to any administrative decision concerning an Indigenous person. I separate that
universe of administrative decisions into three categories: penalty, benefit, and residual (i.e., neither penalty nor benefit). In general, Gladue
principles will be most directly and predictably applicable when considering a penalty against an Indigenous person. While the distinction between penalty and benefit can be a fuzzy one, the application of Gladue
principles when considering a benefit to an Indigenous person tends to be
more limited by statute than in the penalty context. Finally, the residual
category—where the decision concerns neither a penalty nor a benefit—
calls most for ingenuity and creativity by counsel and decision-makers.
This paper is organized in seven parts. I begin in Part I by canvassing
the meaning and legal character of Gladue principles. I explain that they
are best understood as a common law principle that recognizes the legal
implications of the unique circumstances of Indigenous persons, past and
present, particularly their alienation from the criminal justice system,
and the impact of discrimination, cultural genocide, dislocation, and poor
social and economic conditions. In Part II, I examinine why administrative decision-makers, and courts on judicial review of administrative decisions, decline to apply Gladue principles. Based on a comprehensive
search of such decisions, I argue that there are three main reasons for refusal: that the decision is not similar enough to criminal sentencing; that
it is unclear how Gladue principles would apply and how they would af30

See below notes 125–134.

31

See e.g. Aaron Dewitt, “Judicial Review as a Limit to Indigenous Self-Governance”
(2014) 77:2 Sask L Rev 205 at 217–20.

32

For a detailed account, see Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal
Administrative Law” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in
Context, 3rd ed (Toronto: Emond, 2018) 87 at 93–108.
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fect the result; and that the statutory criteria or jurisdiction of the decision-maker preclude the application of Gladue principles. Then, in Part
III, I consider counter-examples, namely decisions where administrative
decision-makers, and courts on judicial review, have applied Gladue factors. I argue that the common thread in these decisions is a liberty- or
wrongdoing-based conception of Gladue principles. This leads me in Part
IV to analyze the appropriate scope of Gladue principles in administrative
law. As I have just indicated, I suggest that the application and impact of
Gladue principles will be relatively straightforward when the decision at
issue is about a benefit or penalty for an Indigenous person who is the
subject of the decision. But where the decision affects the interests of an
Indigenous person who is not the subject of the decision, remoteness must
be considered. Additionally, I argue that, where the decision is not about
a benefit or a penalty, creativity will be required. In Part V, I consider
whether Gladue principles must be explicitly invoked and applied by
name. While concluding that what is important is the substantive application of Gladue principles and not the labelling of those principles, I
suggest that the invocation of Gladue principles provides a ready shorthand and thus serves as a useful indicator for reviewing courts. Then, in
Part VI, I consider the standard of review where a decision-maker fails to
consider or declines to apply Gladue principles. While the standard of review is presumably reasonableness, failure to consider or to apply Gladue
principles will generally be unreasonable. Finally, I conclude in Part VII
with recommendations for administrative decision-makers, judges on judicial review, counsel, legislators, and executive authorities.

I. The Meaning and Legal Character of Gladue Principles
Before I can proceed with the substance of my analysis, I need to first
address two open questions in the literature and case law: what “Gladue
principles” mean and what they are. Despite the many extensions and
applications of Gladue principles beyond criminal law sentencing, there
has yet to be a definitive articulation of what Gladue principles mean or
an identification of their legal character—be it statutory, common law,
quasi-constitutional, constitutional, or some combination thereof. The answers to these underlying questions will inform and potentially limit the
role of Gladue principles in administrative law. Thus, I must begin by
proposing such answers.
First, what do courts mean when they invoke so-called “Gladue principles”? I previously defined Gladue principles as “a recognition of the
unique circumstances of Indigenous persons, particularly their alienation
from the criminal justice system, and the impact of discrimination, cul-
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tural oppression, dislocation, and poor social and economic conditions.”33
This definition has at least three shortcomings. The first is that my definition does not explicitly recognize that the alienation, discrimination,
and other experiences are not only historical but also ongoing, and that
the impact of these experiences is likewise both historical and ongoing.
The second shortcoming is that the phrase “cultural oppression” minimizes what has been better described as “cultural genocide.”34
The third shortcoming is of a different type and has particularly important implications for my analysis in this article. The Gladue and
Ipeelee decisions could merely be cited as instances in which the Court
recognized the facts of anti-Indigenous bias and racism in Canada. Such a
limited application of Gladue is consistent with my earlier definition of
Gladue principles. A better definition of Gladue principles is that these
factual considerations have a particular legal impact and require a particular kind of legal approach—although the specifics of this approach
will vary depending on the circumstances, as I will illustrate through the
remainder of my analysis. Thus, for the purpose of this article, I define
Gladue principles as: a recognition of the legal implications of the unique
circumstances of Indigenous persons, past and present, particularly their
alienation from the criminal justice system, and the impact of discrimination, cultural genocide, dislocation, and poor social and economic conditions.35
The proper role and impact of Gladue principles, however, is contoured not only by their definition but also by their character as a legal
construct within the legal system. Are they statutory, common law, quasiconstitutional, constitutional, or some combination thereof? For present
purposes, I argue that Gladue principles are a common law principle that
may yet be recognized as quasi-constitutional or even constitutional. But
they certainly already exceed their statutory origins.
This is not to deny that, in some contexts, Gladue principles are a
statutory principle. This characteristic is most obvious in criminal sentencing under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, but is also true of the
other narrow and specific statutory extensions of section 718.2(e) listed
above. 36 However, it does not necessarily follow from this that Gladue
principles are solely a statutory principle.

33

Martin, supra note 7 at 24.

34

See e.g. TRC Final Report, supra note 1 at 133. See also Payam Akhavan, “Cultural
Genocide: Legal Label or Mourning Metaphor?” (2017) 62:1 McGill LJ 243.

35

Martin, supra note 7 at 24.

36

See notes 12–16, above.
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As I have traced elsewhere, a line of appellate decisions—mostly from
the Ontario Court of Appeal—interprets Gladue principles as a common
law principle that can apply absent specific statutory direction. 37 The
weakness of characterizing Gladue principles as a common law legal
principle is that they can be overruled or abandoned by subsequent decisions or legislated away by statute.
Indeed, subsequent to those appellate decisions, two decisions from
the Supreme Court of Canada appear to push back, at least in part, on
this common law characterization of Gladue principles.38 More recently,
the original inclusion of Gladue principles in the sentencing provisions,
but not in the bail provisions, of the Criminal Code, led two trial judges—
in either faithful execution of their duties or chutzpah or both—to hold
that Gladue principles did not apply to bail.39 In doing so, these judges rejected precedents that, while not binding on them—and, in their analysis,
not actually persuasive—had nonetheless been uniformly followed. This
split in the case law will presumably be resolved by the 2019 addition of
Gladue provisions to the bail section of the Criminal Code.40
However, just as the statutory role of Gladue principles does not preclude a common law role for such principles, a common law role does not
preclude a constitutional role. The most obvious role for constitutionalized
Gladue principles is as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7
of the Charter.41 The inherent limitation of such a constitutionalization is
that such Gladue principles would apply only where a section 7 interest—
life, liberty, or security of the person—was engaged.42 In contrast, the recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v. Sharma takes the intriguing position that restricting the ability of sentencing judges to
properly and freely apply Gladue principles constitutes unjustifiable discrimination against Indigenous persons under section 15 of the Charter.43
The Court also held that there was a section 7 infringement, but used

37

See Martin, supra note 7 at 34–39. The appellate decisions were R v Sim (2005), 78 OR
(3d) 183, 201 CCC (3d) 482 (ON CA) [cited to OR] [Sim]; Frontenac Ventures, supra
note 18 at para 56; Leonard, supra note 17 at paras 57–59.

38

See Martin, supra note 7 at 39–43. For the Supreme Court’s pushback, see R v Anderson, supra note 17 at paras 27–28 and Kokopenace, supra note 29 at paras 97–102.

39

See R v Heathen, supra note 14; R v Japoody, supra note 14 at paras 73–102.

40

See Criminal Code, supra note 9, s 493.2.

41

Supra note 19. See e.g. Marie Manikis, “Towards Accountability and Fairness for Aboriginal People: The Recognition of Gladue as a Principle of Fundamental Justice that
Applies to Prosecutors” (2016) 21:1 Can Crim L Rev 173.

42

See Martin, supra note 7 at 43–44.

43

R v Sharma, 2020 ONCA 478 at para 132, Feldman JA for the majority, Miller JA, dissenting [Sharma]. Thank you to a reviewer for bringing Sharma to my attention.
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overbreadth—not Gladue principles themselves—as a principle of fundamental justice.44 The most robust and powerful form of constitutionalization—indeed, the legal realization of the full potential of R v. Gladue itself—would be for Gladue principles to be recognized as an unwritten
principle of the Constitution. This seems unlikely at present, but change
may come.
I emphasize here that legal principles can change in form over time.
Perhaps the best example, though seemingly distant from this analysis, is
solicitor-client privilege. Solicitor-client privilege began as a rule of evidence, but is now not only a substantive right but also a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter.45 Indeed, in the leading
treatise, Adam Dodek writes that solicitor-client privilege “as it currently
exists in Canada is best understood as a quasi-constitutional right to
communicate in confidence with one’s lawyer.”46
For now, in my view, Gladue principles are best understood as a
common law principle. To relegate them to a mere statutory role would be
to discard and impede the clear aspirations of the Supreme Court of Canada in Gladue; to attribute to federal and provincial legislators an unrealistic level of comprehensive awareness, discernment, and deliberation; to
create incoherence in the common law; and to limit the ability of administrative decision-makers and judges to do justice in individual cases. While
the Supreme Court of Canada has gestured to an interpretation of Gladue
principles as being merely statutory in Kokopenace and Anderson, the
lower appellate decisions extending the application of Gladue principles
as a common law principle remain, strictly speaking, undisturbed. Until
the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly goes further, lower court judges
can in good faith apply Gladue principles as a common law principle outside the specific contexts of Kokopenace and Anderson. However, in my

44

See ibid at para 174.

45

See e.g. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v University of Calgary, 2016
SCC 53 (“[f]irst, it is well established that solicitor-client privilege has evolved from a
rule of evidence to a rule of substance. Further, ... some even suggest that the Court
has granted it a quasi-constitutional status” at para 38 [citations omitted]); R v
McClure, 2001 SCC 14 (“[s]olicitor-client privilege and the right to make full answer
and defence are principles of fundamental justice” at para 41); Lavallee, Rackel &
Heintz v Canada (AG); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada (AG); R v Fink, 2002
SCC 61, Arbour J for the majority (“[s]olicitor-client privilege is a rule of evidence, an
important civil and legal right and a principle of fundamental justice in Canadian law”
at para 49).

46

Adam M Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at § 2.12
[emphasis added]. For a history of that transformation and evolution, see ibid at
§§ 2.2–2.12.
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view, there is simply too little—if any—existing support to go further and
constitutionalize Gladue principles, at least at this time.47

II. Why Do Administrative Decision-Makers Decline to Apply Gladue
Principles?
A review of Canadian cases since R v. Gladue reveals three main reasons and two ancillary reasons for which administrative decision-makers,
and courts on judicial review, decline to apply Gladue principles.
First, the most fundamental and conceptual reason for declining to
apply Gladue principles in administrative law is that the specific context
and nature of the decision is not similar enough to criminal sentencing.
This reasoning is sometimes conclusory, but is sometimes more elaborate.
A conclusory example comes from Re Can-Am Urban Native NonProfit Homes (Windsor) Inc.,48 in which a landlord applied to terminate a
tenancy and evict the Indigenous tenant for illegal acts on the rental
premises. Counsel for the tenant argued Gladue principles, specifically on
restorative justice and lesser sentences. The decision-maker rejected this
argument on the conclusory basis that “this case is distinguishable from
Gladue ..., as the Tribunal is considering the tenancy and not a sentencing of the Tenant.”49
A more developed rationale was given in Desmoulin v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.50 Desmoulin was a judicial review of a decision
denying an Indigenous applicant compensation for injuries at a training
school.51 The denial was based on the applicant’s subsequent criminal activity.52 The court rejected the Gladue argument on the basis that even if
Gladue principles could be properly extended from their original statutory
sentencing context, such extensions had only been applied in criminal law
contexts where “personal freedom” was at stake—not where the decision

47

A fascinating and worthwhile legislative option would be to give Gladue principles
quasi-constitutional character, such as by incorporating them into human rights law or
merely codifying that statutory Gladue principles prevail over any other statutory provision. These ideas, however, are beyond the scope of this article.

48

2005 CarswellOnt 10450 (WL Can) (Ont Landlord & Tenant Board) [Re Can-Am].

49

Ibid at para 24, point 3.

50

2015 ONSC 3696 [Desmoulin].

51

See ibid at para 3.

52

See ibid.
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under review was a civil matter and not a criminal one.53 As I will return
to below, the court nonetheless held that the applicant’s “cultural background” was a relevant factor that the administrative decision-maker had
properly considered.54
The reasoning in Moore v. Law Society of British Columbia is to similar effect.55 Moore was a judicial review of decisions of the law society’s
credentials committee regarding an Indigenous lawyer transferring from
another province.56 In holding that there was no obligation to consider
Gladue principles,57 Justice Watchuk noted that Gladue concerned criminal sentencing and that “[a]lthough Gladue factors have been applied
outside the criminal law context, they have only been applied in relation
to the imposition of penalties or disciplinary sanctions.”58 Justice Watchuk also explicitly noted that there was no exact precedent: “There was no
reported case before the court where a law society has applied Gladue factors in a decision regarding admission to practice.”59
Similar reasoning is evident in Resource Development Trades Council
of Newfoundland and Labrador v. Muskrat Falls Employers’ Association,60 a judicial review of a grievance in which the arbitrator refused to
reinstate an Indigenous employee involved in an unlawful strike. The
court held that termination in a unionized work environment was too dissimilar to, among other things, criminal sentencing for Gladue principles
to apply: “[t]he authorities referred to by the Union deal with the importance of recognizing and protecting aboriginal culture and heritage in
the context of criminal sentencing and child custody and adoption circum53

See ibid at paras 29–30. The court relied for this premise—that Gladue principles may
extend beyond criminal sentencing—on a decision that was vehemently reversed on
appeal (see R v Kokopenace, 2013 ONCA 389, rev’d Kokopenace, supra note 29).

54

See Desmoulin, supra note 50 at paras 31–32. See also note 148 and accompanying
text.

55

Moore v Law Society of British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 1084 [Moore]. The underlying
facts and the alleged failure to consider Gladue principles were also the basis for an
unsuccessful human rights complaint (see A v Law Society of British Columbia, 2018
BCHRT 256, reconsideration denied, 2019 BCHRT 29).

56

See Moore, supra note 55 at paras 2–8.

57

See ibid at para 92.

58

Ibid at paras 78–79. “The only case law provided on the use of Gladue factors in the
law society context is Robinson, which involved disciplinary proceedings. These decisions are not such proceedings” (ibid at para 92). See also Robinson, supra note 24.

59

Moore, supra note 55 at para 79. This was reinforced by the recent decision in Turner v
Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONLSTH 95, a good character hearing for an Indigenous
lawyer applicant, in which Gladue principles were not mentioned in the panel’s reasons.

60

2016 NLTD(G) 23.
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stances. ... These decisions are not relevant to the contractual environment of a collective agreement and a voluntary employer/employee relationship.”61
While Re Can-Am, Desmoulin, Moore, and Muskrat Falls squarely reject Gladue principles, the impact of Lewis v. Canada (Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness) on the role of those principles in administrative
law is less clear.62 The Federal Court of Appeal in Lewis held that Gladue
principles did not apply to a deportation decision concerning a nonIndigenous parent with an Indigenous child in Canada.63 For my purposes, what is important from Lewis is that Justice Gleason for the panel appeared—without clear justification, in my view—to limit the extension of
Gladue principles to contexts where an interest under section 7 of the
Charter was engaged. 64 In doing so, she rejected precedents extending
Gladue principles absent such a section 7 interest.65 Ironically, while appearing to implicitly constitutionalize Gladue principles into a principle of
fundamental justice under section 7,66 she simultaneously restricted their
potential scope by holding that they have only that status and that they
do not and cannot apply outside section 7. The impact of Lewis for my
analysis is even less clear because after rejecting Gladue arguments, Justice Gleason nonetheless went on to find that the decision was unreasonable because deportation would isolate the child from her Indigenous heritage.67
These decisions—Re Can-Am, Desmoulin, Moore, Muskrat Falls, and
Lewis—span many substantive areas of law, but nonetheless share a reluctance to consider any incremental extension of Gladue principles beyond existing precedent. I do not suggest that such reluctance betrays an
intellectual laziness or undue risk aversion. But it reveals a very narrow
view both of the role and powers of administrative decision-makers and
judges on judicial review, and of the aspirations of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Gladue itself. In particular, Justice Watchuk in Moore exem-

61

Ibid at para 41. Gladue principles were also argued in a penalty arbitration (see
Weyerhaeuser Canada Ltd v IWA-Canada, Local 1-207 (2002), 67 CLAS 137 at para 27,
[2002] AGAA No 3), but the arbitrator held that it was unnecessary to consider the argument (see ibid at para 37).

62

2017 FCA 130 [Lewis].

63

Ibid.

64

See ibid at paras 66–68.

65

See ibid at para 68; Robinson, supra note 24.

66

See Lewis, supra note 62 at para 66. See also Manikis, supra note 41 (arguing that
Gladue principles should be recognized as a principle of fundamental justice).

67

See Lewis, supra note 62 at paras 85–92.
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plifies this approach in her reliance on the fact that there was “no reported case” to be precisely followed as exact precedent.68
I acknowledge, however, that this caution in extending Gladue outside
the criminal context is not unique to administrative law. One example is
that courts in child protection matters are divided on the application of
Gladue principles. Thus, the court in X (Re) observed that criminal sentencing was “un contexte extrêmement différent”69 and that “il faut être extrêmement prudents avant de faire des rapprochements entre deux sphères
aussi distinctes du droit.”70 Likewise, the reasons in Alberta (Child, Youth
and Family Enhancement Act, Director) v. JR emphasized not only the
differences in the statutory regimes—specifically that child protection is
protective, not punitive—but also the differences in the “rationale and the
remedies.”71 Other child protection courts have nonetheless applied similar considerations to those underlying Gladue principles. 72 Another ex68

See Moore, supra note 55 at para 79. See also note 59 and accompanying text.

69

X (Re), 2002 CanLII 38040 at para 35, (sub nom K(M-K), Re) 2002 CarswellQue 1256
(WL Can) (QC CQ) (“an extremely different context” [translated by author]).

70

Ibid at para 39 (“[o]ne must be extremely careful before making connections between
two such distinct spheres of law” [translated by author]). The court nonetheless took
Indigeneity into account (see ibid at para 41). Contrast that decision with e.g. X (Re),
2001 CanLII 25881, (sub nom X (Dans la situation de)) [2001] QJ No 8159 (QC CQ), by
the same judge months earlier (“[a]lthough the Court keeps in mind that this decision
[Gladue] has been rendered in a criminal context, the Supreme Court has pointed out
that a judge should be cautious when taking a decision regarding Aboriginal people,
not to contribute to any systematic discrimination” at para 22).

71

Alberta (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, Director) v JR, 2018 ABPC 258 at
para 52 [JR]. See also Child Youth and Family Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c C-12;
Alberta (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, Director) v CL, 2020 ABPC 23
(“ ‘Gladue factors’ do not apply to family matters. ... Serious consideration must be given to how society can now break the cycle of poverty, family violence, and drug and alcohol abuse and resolve issues of housing, poverty, and intergenerational trauma ...
However, the question for the Court in this case is ‘what is in the best interest of the
Children at this time?’. Gladue principles do not help with that decision” at paras 184–
85). But see Alberta (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, Director) v JSA, 2019
ABPC 32 (“I agree with his distinction [in JR] between sentencing on criminal matters
and child protection matters but the factors described in Gladue may be an appropriate
consideration with respect to the Director’s obligation to provide services, insofar as it
is reasonably practicable, to assist the family and to work with the family to alleviate
the concerns pursuant to s. 2(e)(i) and s. 2(j)” at para 68).

72

See e.g. CFS Western MB v NRM and KM-S, 2019 MBQB 127 (“[t]he Supreme Court of
Canada, within the sentencing context in criminal proceedings has instructed judges to
consider certain factors in the sentencing of Indigenous offenders. ... Similar considerations should apply in child protection hearings” at paras 99–100 [citations omitted]).
See also New Brunswick (Minister of Social Development) v A(M), 2014 NBQB 130 at
para 83. Contrast that approach with e.g. Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society
v R(J), 2015 ONSC 2054 (“Native heritage is very important to children, but it cannot
override other needs that each specific child has; these children must be protected from
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ample of this caution is Armstrong v. McCusker, a motion to change child
support paid by an Indigenous parent to another Indigenous parent for
the benefit of an Indigenous child.73 In declining to apply Gladue principles, the court in Armstrong emphasized the difference between support
and sentencing: “[T]he payor’s liberty interest is not at stake, nor is the
Indigenous payor facing punitive state action ... Very importantly, there
are other individuals whose interests are at stake here, in particular Indigenous children and Indigenous mothers.”74
The second reason for declining to apply Gladue principles is less conceptual and more pragmatic: that the decision-maker cannot determine
how Gladue principles properly apply in the particular context or matter,
that is, what impact they should have on the decision. Consider for example the decision of the Ontario Consent and Capacity Board in DB (Re),
reviewing an Indigenous person’s capacity to consent to treatment and
the imposition of a community treatment order: “Assuming without deciding that the board had jurisdiction to consider Gladue principles, it was
not clear to the Board as to how or in what way the Board was to take
that into consideration.”75 Like the first reason, this second reason perhaps suggests a lack of imagination or ingenuity, but more importantly it
reveals that Gladue is not a self-executing magic word whose mere invocation changes the outcome of a case.
The third and most intractable reason for declining to apply Gladue
principles is that there are statutory constraints that limit the jurisdiction of decision-makers, the factors that they may consider, or the reme-

a volatile and unstable future so that the traumas of the past are not repeated. Regrettably, the application of ‘Gladue principles’ would not accomplish the security that each
needs” at para 257); CM v Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, 2015 ONCA 612 (“we are not persuaded that Gladue principles affect the determination of whether an access order would be appropriate in this case ... Under these circumstances, an access order was not available under the CFSA [Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11]—and Gladue principles did not in any way assist in making that determination” at paras 7, 18). But see Children’s Aid Society of the Regional
Municipality of Waterloo v CT, 2017 ONCA 931 (“[c]ourts recognize the pervasive effects of the historical and continuing harms to First Nations families. This does not,
however, automatically exempt Indigenous children from the access provisions for
Crown wards under the Act. The legislation makes clear that the circumstances of each
individual child must be considered in their entire context. A parallel can be drawn
with the court’s approach to the sentencing of Indigenous offenders ... While Gladue
principles do not directly apply to access to a Crown ward, the Supreme Court’s comments about context and the need for case-specific evidence are instructive” at paras
53–55 [citations omitted, emphasis in original]).
73

See Armstrong v McCusker, 2018 ONCJ 620 [Armstrong].

74

Ibid at paras 135–36.

75

DB (Re), 2017 CanLII 58736 (Ont Consent and Capacity Board) at 14 [DB (Re)].
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dies or benefits that they may order. While there appear to be no enabling
statutes that explicitly preclude the application of Gladue principles (and
such preclusion would be a red flag for the prospects of reconciliation76),
there are many that reach the same result by their facially neutral terms.
For example, the applicant for Ontario Disability Support in 1710-08668
(Re) submitted a Gladue report which recommended, among other things,
“access to traditional healing and wellness support services, indigenous
specific mental health counselling, as well as access to any and all physical health support services of the Appellant’s choice.”77 The Tribunal noted that under its enabling statute, it lacked jurisdiction to order these
benefits. 78 A similar outcome occurred in Anonyme — 181108 and
Anonyme — 181109, reviews of two denials of legal aid in which
“[l]’avocat invoque les arrêts Gladue et Ipeelee afin de justifier la couverture du service demandé.”79 The Committee, making no further mention of
Gladue, held that the applicant did not meet the mandatory or discretionary criteria in the relevant statute and thus refused to order that legal aid be provided to her.80 Similarly, recall that the Consent and Capacity Board in DB (Re) suggested that even if Gladue principles could somehow be applied, it might not have the jurisdiction to do so.81 This third
reason is intractable insofar as Gladue principles are a common law principle and not constitutionalized.
Like the first reason, this third reason for declining to apply Gladue
principles is not unique to administrative law. Consider for example On76

I acknowledge the possible argument that explicitly barring the consideration of
Gladue principles may engage section 15 of the Charter, but that argument is beyond
the scope of my analysis.

77

1710-08668 (Re), 2019 ONSBT 431 at para 16 (Social Benefits Tribunal).

78

See ibid (“[t]he Tribunal’s jurisdiction is granted to it by the ODSPA. That legislation
does not confer on the Tribunal the authority to order remedies such as those recommended by the Gladue report. The Tribunal therefore lacks the jurisdiction to make
any rulings related to the Appellant’s access to treatment and support services. Accordingly, these matters were not considered further by the Tribunal in this appeal” at para
17); Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997, SO 1997, c 25, Schedule B.

79

Anonyme — 181108, 2018 QCCSJ 1108 at para 6 (Legal Services Commission Review
Committee) [181108]; Anonyme — 181109, 2018 QCCSJ 1109 at para 6 [181109] (Legal
Services Commission Review Committee) (“[c]ounsel relies on Gladue and Ipeelee to
justify coverage of the service requested” [translated by author]).

80

See 181108, supra note 79 at paras 10–11; 181109, supra note 79 at paras 10–11. Conversely, see Anonyme — 21337, 2021 QCCSJ 337 at paras 6, 11 (Legal Services Commission Review Committee), where Gladue principles were argued but the Committee,
making no further mention of Gladue, held that the applicant met one of the discretionary criteria in the relevant statute.

81

See DB (Re), supra note 75 (“[a]ssuming without deciding that the Board had jurisdiction to consider Gladue principles, it was not clear to the Board as to how or in what
way the Board was to take that into consideration” at 14).
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tario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. McMurter, an application
for enforcement of a spousal support order.82 In granting the application,
the court held that the statutory scheme precluded a role for Gladue principles.83
A fourth potential reason is that Gladue principles or Gladue arguments are unnecessary to determine the matter, (i.e., that the decision or
the judicial review can be determined on other grounds). For example, on
judicial review of the revocation of an Indigenous person’s statutory release by the Parole Board of Canada, the court in Joly v. Canada (Attorney General) held that the matter could be determined on procedural
fairness grounds and thus it was unnecessary to consider the failure to
apply Gladue principles.84 It is worth emphasizing here that even where
Gladue principles are strictly unnecessary to decide the matter, declining
to consider them in the alternative creates gaps for a court on judicial review or on an appeal from judicial review.
A fifth potential reason for declining to apply Gladue principles is that
there is insufficient relevant evidence before the decision-maker. Consider
82

Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v McMurter, 2017 ONCJ 947 [McMurter ONCJ]. See also McMurter v Director, FRO, 2017 ONSC 3662, where a stay pending appeal was denied.

83

See McMurter ONCJ, supra note 82 (“[t]he underlying factors in Gladue such as systemic discrimination, social and economic deprivation, and historical dislocation may
have relevance to an indigenous payor’s ability to pay. However once he or she is found
to have the resources necessary to pay a support obligation, the Court must make those
orders only within the context of the statutory framework of the FRSAEA ... I find that
the application of Gladue is not required in this proceeding as to whether there shall be
an order of committal” at paras 55, 65); Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 31. The decision in McMurter also reveals the first kind
of reason for failing to apply Gladue principles, namely that the context is distinguishable from criminal sentencing. See McMurter ONCJ, supra note 82 (“[h]owever, support enforcement proceedings under the Act are not criminal proceedings with a ‘true
penal consequence’. There is no information sworn, no criminal record is created, and
incarceration is not imposed where there is an inability to pay. As its object, a committal order in the context of a default of a support enforcement order is to ensure compliance with Court ordered support obligations with no culpability or blameworthiness of
the support payor determined by the Court” at paras 53–54).

84

See Joly v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 1253 at para 104. See also Blacksmith v Canada
(AG), 2017 FC 605; Rain v Canada (Parole Board), 2015 ABQB 639 (where the court
declined to consider the habeas corpus application and thus it was unnecessary to consider the merits, including a Gladue argument); Earhart v Canada (AG), 2015 ONSC
5218 at paras 45–46 (a habeas corpus application where the court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether Gladue principles were applicable in prisoner reclassification and transfer decisions, though the decision-maker had explicitly considered them).
Contrast this approach with Lorne Snooks c Giordano, 2019 QCCS 1766 at paras 77–
78, and Germa c Tremblay, 2019 QCCS 1764 at paras 98–99 (where the habeas corpus
applications were denied on the basis that Gladue principles had been properly considered in the transfer and reclassification decisions).
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here Tuckanow v. Bowden Penitentiary, reviewing the decision to transfer
an Indigenous inmate to a higher-security institution: “While I could not
say that Gladue would never apply within the context of corrections decisions, there is no reason on the basis of these facts to find that it does.”85
To similar effect is Law Society of Alberta v. Willier, about the applicability of Gladue principles to costs orders in disciplinary proceedings involving Indigenous lawyers. In that decision, the panel did not rule out the
application of Gladue principles to penalty or costs determination, but
held that there was no relevant evidence before it.86 This fifth potential
reason relates to legal uncertainty over the proper scope of judicial notice
and the need for specific evidence about the circumstances of the particular Indigenous person who is the subject of the decision.87
I acknowledge here that Gladue principles may not change the result
in every case—especially where the decision is a binary one, such as in
the determination of eligibility for a benefit. That is, it is necessary to dis85

Tuckanow v Bowden Penitentiary, 2014 ABQB 563 at para 49 [Tuckanow]. Tuckanow
is also about uncertainty over what impact Gladue principles could have in the particular circumstances: “Mr. Tuckanow suggests that rather than being transferred, alternative measures should have been taken in his case. No suggestions have been made
as to what those alternatives would have been in light of the concerns giving rise to his
reclassification” (ibid). See also Gunner (Re), [2017] ORBD No 3001 (“[a]lthough moot
considering the above Disposition, the Board found that there was no evidence directly
related to the evidential foundation necessary to consider the Gladue principles” at para 19).

86

Law Society of Alberta v Willier, 2018 ABLS 22 at para 35 [Willier].

87

See e.g. Robinson, supra note 24 at para 32, as described and cited in Martin, supra
note 7 (“[w]hile the hearing panel held that the lawyer’s Indigeneity was not a mitigating factor, citing ‘the lack of evidence[’] ... or ‘case-specific information,’” the appeal
panel—holding that there was such evidence—[reversed and] substituted a suspension
of one year” at 30). See also e.g. Willier, supra note 86 (“[s]uch individualized evidence
is required by Gladue and related cases in the criminal sentencing context” at para 35).
More recently, see Law Society of Ontario v Loder, 2021 ONLSTH 66 at paras 52–61,
especially para 58 [citation omitted]: “Law Society counsel submitted that Mr. Loder
failed to show how his [Indigenous] background may have played a role in the professional misconduct as found and, accordingly, that his background should not properly
be seen as a mitigating circumstance. We agree with this submission. Absent some
demonstrated connection between his background and the proven misconduct, there is
no basis from which to conclude that his background provides a mitigating circumstance as claimed.” In the criminal sentencing context, see e.g. R v Monckton, 2017
ONCA 450 (“[t]he problem lies in the vagueness of the information concerning the appellant’s attitude towards his Aboriginal status. The court was merely provided with
general information from the appellant’s father about his son’s interest in his heritage.
Of course, the appellant is not required to draw a straight line between his Aboriginal
roots and the offences for which he is being sentenced ... However, more is required
than the bare assertion of an offender’s Aboriginal status. ... In the materials placed before us, there is no information from the appellant, or about the appellant, that lifts his
life circumstances and Aboriginal status from the general to the specific” at paras 114–
17). Thank you to a reviewer for bringing Monckton to my attention.
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tinguish between a decision-maker who declines to apply Gladue principles and a decision-maker whose application of Gladue principles does not
change the outcome of the case.

III. Counter-Examples: Why Do Administrative Decision-Makers Apply
Gladue Principles?
In this part, I provide some counter-examples, that is, decisions where
administrative decision-makers or courts on judicial review apply Gladue
principles. These decisions reveal a coherent basis for counteracting or responding to some of the reasons discussed in Part II, particularly a reluctance to extend Gladue principles beyond criminal sentencing.88 As I will
return to below, the decisions that I examine in Part III are all fundamentally decisions about penalty, although at first glance they mostly involve liberty.
The least surprising extension of Gladue principles to administrative
law is to decisions of the provincial review boards regarding not criminally responsible (NCR) accused under the Criminal Code. While these dispositions are not sentences, they resemble sentences and indeed are an
integral part of the criminal justice system. Justice Sharpe in R v. Sim
gave several reasons for applying Gladue principles in this context.89 The
most important for my purposes are, first, that NCR dispositions, like
sentences, are relevant to estrangement and overincarceration;90 and second, that Gladue principles are relevant to the statutory criteria that review boards must apply. 91 While Sim concerned NCR accused, review
boards have also applied Gladue to dispositions for accused unfit to stand
trial.92
While Sim was the first decision in which a court confirmed that review boards must apply Gladue principles to Indigenous NCR accused, a
dissenting member of the British Columbia Review Board in Alexis (Re)
had done so before Sim.93 That dissenting member noted that, “for this
particular accused, it is not only entirely appropriate, but indeed neces88

As indicated in the footnotes that follow, in this Part, I draw heavily on Martin, supra
note 7.

89

See R v Sim, supra note 37. See also Martin, supra note 7 at 35–36.

90

See R v Sim, supra note 37 at paras 15–16. See especially ibid (“I do not think that the
principles underlying Gladue should be limited to the sentencing process and I can see
no reason to disregard the Gladue principles when assessing the criminal justice system’s treatment of NCR accused” at para 16).

91

See R v Sim, supra note 37 at paras 17–24.

92

See e.g. Chickite (Re), [2008] BCRBD No 11 at para 39, 2008 CarswellBC 3953.

93

See Alexis (Re), [2003] BCRBD No 1, 2003 CarswellBC 3702.
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sary to include in the analysis the unique, historic, cultural, political, and
systemic components of his aboriginal heritage and traditions ... Mr. Alexis’ circumstances are unique and different from those of other NCRMD
[NCR on account of mental disorder] accused.” 94 While the dissenting
member noted that Gladue originated in sentencing provisions of the
Criminal Code, he held that “[s]uch considerations would also appear entirely consistent with and correspond to or further the criteria in s. 672.54
[the Criminal Code provision on dispositions for NCR accused].”95
Perhaps the least surprising extension of Gladue principles to judicial
review beyond matters under the Criminal Code is to extradition. Extradition is fundamentally about overriding the individual’s liberty interest
for the purpose of criminal proceedings, albeit proceedings in another jurisdiction. Justice Sharpe in United States v. Leonard, overturning the
minister’s surrender decision on judicial review, held that Gladue principles are relevant for decision-makers, judges or otherwise, “whenever an
Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and related proceedings.”96 While it is clear from the reasoning in Leonard that Gladue principles should apply if liberty is engaged in “criminal and related proceedings,” which Justice Sharpe did not define further, this holding does not
necessarily mean that Gladue principles can only apply in such circumstances (i.e., that such circumstances are requirements for the application
of Gladue principles).97 I will return to this scope issue below.98
Leonard was followed in Sheck, in which the majority of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal held that Gladue principles—or at least the
“historical context” underlying them99—were relevant when the extradi-

94

Ibid at para 80.

95

Ibid at para 82.

96

Leonard, supra note 17 at para 85.

97

See Martin, supra note 7 (“Leonard leaves open, however, the scope of ‘related proceedings’ and whether engagement of the liberty interest is necessary, not just sufficient,
for the application of Gladue principles. ... [T]here is nothing in the reasoning of Sharpe
JA in Leonard to suggest that Gladue principles cannot apply where the liberty interest is not engaged, or that that was his intention. Indeed, if he had purported to decide
that Gladue principles apply only where the liberty interest is engaged, that holding
would have been obiter, as that question was not at issue on the facts of the case” at 38,
44).

98

See note 123 and accompanying text.

99

See Sheck v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2019 BCCA 364 [Sheck] (“[i]t cannot be said
that the best interests of the children will be meaningfully considered if the Indigenous status of the children and their parent is not taken into account. To take this into account, one has to appreciate the same historical context that underlies the
Gladue factors” at para 77). I consider below in Part 4 whether this distinction—
between Gladue principles and something different that shares the same “historical
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tion of an Indigenous parent would separate him from his Indigenous
children:
The impact on Mr. Sheck and his Indigenous children of the Canadian history of separating Indigenous parents and children, and the
resultant destruction of Indigenous communities, which, in some
ways, may have contributed to Mr. Sheck’s alleged criminality, were
important factors in informing the Minister’s view.100

Sheck is thus important insofar as it applies Gladue principles both to the
interests of the subject of the decision and to the interests of other persons directly affected by the decision.
As unsurprising as Leonard, although perhaps more important, is the
extension of Gladue principles to parole in Twins. Parole is intrinsically
linked to sentences, if not sentencing. After reviewing other cases in
which Gladue had been extended—in both matters under the Criminal
Code (bail and review board decisions) and outside of it (extradition and
sentencing for civil contempt)101—Justice Southcott held that the determinative factor was Indigenous overincarceration and estrangement, and
that Gladue principles would thus apply in “a range of circumstances in
which Aboriginal peoples interact with the justice system,” including parole revocation.102
Gladue principles have similarly been applied to inmate segregation
decisions.103 In reviewing one such decision in Hamm v. Canada (Attorney
General), the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench emphasized the similarity
to criminal sentencing and the engagement of liberty in its discussion of
Gladue principles: “Given Parliament’s focus on the objectives of the sentencing system, and thus of the correctional system, in relation to aboriginal offenders, it is unreasonable for a correctional institution to deny
transparency in relation to its decisions concerning whether, and how,
and where, aboriginal offenders should be further deprived of liberty.”104
Likewise, in British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General), the British Columbia Supreme Court partly based its
holding that the use of administrative segregation infringes the section 15
context”—is a meaningful one. Thanks to Rob Currie for bringing Sheck to my attention.
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Charter rights of Indigenous inmates on the superficial application of
Gladue principles to segregation decisions: “There is a box to be ticked on
a form and it is ticked. Meaningful results have not followed.”105 Though
the section 15 infringement was successfully appealed, the underlying
factual finding of a failure to meaningfully apply Gladue principles was
not questioned on that appeal.106 While this case was not, strictly speaking, a judicial review of the underlying decisions, it is nonetheless illustrative for my purposes.
Perhaps the most surprising extension of Gladue principles (i.e., the
extension to the context most unlike criminal sentencing) has been to the
professional discipline of Indigenous lawyers. In Law Society of Upper
Canada v. Terence John Robinson, the appeal panel of the Law Society of
Upper Canada (as it then was) acknowledged that professional discipline
has four relevant differences from criminal law sentencing: the lawyer’s
liberty interest is not engaged, the Criminal Code provision underlying
Gladue does not apply, lawyer discipline does not relate to the problem of
Indigenous overincarceration, and lawyer discipline has a different purpose than criminal sentencing.107 However, these differences meant only
that Gladue principles applied differently.108 What was determinative was
that factors relevant to criminal sentencing were also relevant to determination of disciplinary penalties, particularly “the seriousness of misconduct or conduct unbecoming and circumstances that offer aggravation
or mitigation[,] ... the culpability or moral blameworthiness of the licensee[,] ... [and] the character of the licensee,”109 and to the purpose of discipline itself, “to enhance respect for, and confidence in our profession and
the self-regulation of all of its members.”110 While the conduct at issue in
Robinson was itself criminal, Robinson has been followed in one decision
in which the underlying conduct was not criminal.111
Similar to the decision in Robinson was Police Ethics Commissioner v.
Ross.112 In Ross, the Comité de Déontologie Policière considered, and ap-
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pears to have applied, Gladue principles in the discipline of Indigenous
police officers. The uncertainty over whether the committee applied
Gladue principles arises because of the reviewing court’s use of the phrase
“a examiné”: “Le comité en imposant une rétrogradation plutôt qu’une suspension de 60 jours a examiné les principes de l’arrêt Gladue. Cet arrêt,
tenant compte de la surpopulation carcérale d’autochtones préconise une
détermination de peine selon une approche corrective.”113 The committee
itself did not explain why or if Gladue principles applied. However, it did
note the submissions of the officers that Gladue principles should apply.114
Similar to Robinson and Ross was the decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Massage Therapists of Ontario in Alana Grace
Nahdee, RMT.115 The Committee in Nahdee held that the circumstances
of Nahdee, as an Indigenous professional, were “unique.”116 As an alternative to a longer suspension, the Committee applied Gladue principles to
shorten the suspension and instead required Nahdee to make a presentation “regarding the importance of increasing the number of aboriginal
persons working in healthcare in Ontario, and discussing her journey in
overcoming her personal difficulties to become an RMT [Registered Massage Therapist].”117
What do these decisions have in common? In contrast to the decisions
analyzed in the previous part, these decisions demonstrate a willingness
to incrementally extend Gladue principles beyond narrow and strict precLII 57332, AZ-50189016 (SOQUIJ) (Qc CDP)), rev’d in part Isaac c Commissaire à la
déontologie policière, 2005 CanLII 26460, [2005] JQ no 9834 (CQ (Civ Div)) [Isaac].
113
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edents and without explicit statutory signalling. They focus on a connection to sentencing, criminal law, or liberty more broadly. At a deeper level, this difference in approach is a disagreement about the role of decisionmakers and courts on judicial review and the constraints of precedent and
statute.
The decision-makers in Robinson, Ross, and Nahdee go furthest by interpreting the scope of Gladue principles as transcending liberty. What is
different about Nahdee, as compared to Robinson and Ross, is that Robinson and Ross are about persons within the justice system, namely lawyers
and police. The alienation and estrangement from the justice system that
forms the core of Gladue is most obviously relevant to lawyers and police
as persons within that system. Nahdee is instead about a health professional, for whom alienation and estrangement from the justice system is
not directly relevant. Instead, as I will discuss further below, Nahdee
suggests that Gladue principles are more broadly relevant to estrangement not only from the justice system per se, but the administrative state
itself.
Before proceeding, I distinguish tribunal decisions that cite Gladue
merely as support for a recognition of anti-Indigenous bias and racism.
Consider for example the human rights decision in Commission des droits
de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (Régis et autres) c. Blais, in
which the tribunal cited Gladue as support for the proposition that judges
may take judicial notice of “des facteurs systématiques et historiques généraux touchant les Autochtones, notamment le fait qu’ils soient victimes de
préjugés raciaux.” 118 Such application of Gladue is not properly understood as an application of Gladue principles. While that factor in Blais
contributed to the quantum of damages, that is qualitatively different
from the idea that I introduce in the next Part of Gladue principles increasing a benefit.

IV. The Scope of Gladue Principles in Administrative Law
In this Part, I combine my analysis in Parts II and III to determine
the appropriate scope of Gladue principles in administrative law. I start
by considering the scope of the reasons in Gladue itself. I then group the
existing cases that have applied Gladue principles. I characterize them as
cases about penalty, though they may often appear to be about liberty. I
then argue that there are three levels at which Gladue principles can ap-
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ply, of which penalty is the first and least controversial: Gladue principles
can apply to increase the threshold for a penalty to be applied, decrease a
penalty, or substitute alternative penalties. The second level, which is the
counterpart to penalty but one step further, is benefit: Gladue principles
can apply to decrease the threshold for a benefit to be provided or to increase a benefit. The third level, and admittedly the most ambitious, difficult,
and amorphous, is a residual level that is neither penalty nor benefit.

A. Context: R v. Gladue Itself
In determining the appropriate limits of the extension of Gladue principles, the reasons in Gladue must be considered. While the extent envisioned in Gladue itself is not necessarily determinative, it does provide a
natural starting point and arguably a minimum extent to which Gladue
principles should be applied.
While Gladue itself was about the sentencing of an Indigenous offender, Justices Cory and Iacobucci for the Court were explicit that the root
problem was not overincarceration alone. Instead, overincarceration was
just one highly visible indicator of a broader estrangement: “the excessive
imprisonment of aboriginal people is only the tip of the iceberg insofar as
the estrangement of the aboriginal peoples from the Canadian criminal
justice system is concerned.”119 The reasons in the following paragraphs
then refer back twice to the “criminal justice system”: to “a crisis in the
Canadian criminal justice system”120 and to “the greater problem of aboriginal alienation from the criminal justice system.”121 On their own, these
references may be read as limiting the scope of the problem—or reflexively, the scope of Gladue principles as a response to that problem—to matters involving the criminal justice system.
But this second reference situates that overincarceration and alienation in the broader social context, “including poverty, substance abuse,
lack of education, and the lack of employment opportunities for aboriginal
people ... [as well as] bias against aboriginal people.”122 Moreover, Justices
Cory and Iacobucci explicitly recognize that “[t]here are many aspects of
this sad situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons.”123 The impact of these socio-economic factors extend beyond involvement with the
criminal justice system, and there is no reason to think that this bias is
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restricted to the criminal justice system. Thus, the reasons in Gladue in
no way preclude—indeed, may be read as calling for—the extension of
Gladue principles beyond criminal law.
I have suggested elsewhere that Gladue principles are necessary and
appropriate wherever Indigenous estrangement from the justice system,
including but not limited to the criminal justice system, is at issue.124
What this approach would mean for administrative law depends on
whether the colonially imposed Canadian administrative state is fundamentally different than, and separable from, the colonially imposed Canadian justice system. The answer would seem to be that it is not. Granted, there are few if any available quantitative indicators of alienation and
estrangement from the administrative state that parallel levels of Indigenous overincarceration. The closest analogue is likely the disproportionate involvement of Indigenous children in the child protection system.125
In contrast, no statistics are available on the eviction rates of Indigenous
tenants as compared to tenants overall, for example.126 Similarly, there is
no quantitative evidence that professional regulators over-investigate or
over-discipline Indigenous professionals,127 although Indigenous lawyers
disproportionately practice in settings that tend to attract more investiga-
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tions and discipline.128 Moreover, the under-representation of Indigenous
persons in the legal profession itself suggests estrangement.129 Perhaps another acknowledgement or indication that the regulatory apparatus of the
administrative state is ill-suited to Indigenous professionals is the fact
that the Ontario Regulated Health Professions Act does not apply to traditional “aboriginal healers” and “aboriginal midwives” practicing in Indigenous communities.130
Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe that the estrangement
and alienation of Indigenous peoples from the colonial Canadian criminal
justice system, and the bias against them within that system, can be disentangled from the estrangement and alienation from, and bias within,
the colonial Canadian administrative state. Indeed, the impacts of colonialism recognized in Gladue—“poverty, substance abuse, lack of education,
and the lack of employment opportunities for aboriginal people ... [as well
as] bias against aboriginal people”131—apply beyond the criminal justice
system. Perhaps the most powerful historical indicators of alienation and
estrangement are the automatic loss of Indian status for Indigenous people who became doctors or lawyers (or clergy) and the historical prohibition on bands retaining lawyers.132 Recent examples are only somewhat
less disconcerting. A powerful example here is Anonyme, where an Indigenous person was denied legal aid—a denial that exacerbates estrangement via a missed opportunity to assist in the navigation of the criminal
justice system.133 More recently, the Ontario Health Professions Appeal
and Review Board has held that the College of Physicians and Surgeons
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of Ontario inadequately investigated an Indigenous parent’s complaint of
bias in her daughter’s treatment.134
It is on this basis that I argue there are three levels at which Gladue
principles can appropriately apply in administrative decision-making. I
describe these as levels because the first level is the least controversial,
the second is more controversial, and the third is the most controversial.
That Gladue principles apply at up to three levels does not mean they
apply the same way in every context. Indeed, this is the subtle brilliance
of the extension of Gladue principles to the discipline of Indigenous lawyers in Robinson: Gladue principles apply in contexts different from criminal sentencing; they just apply differently. 135 At the same time, I
acknowledge the concern that Gladue principles must have some limits if
they are to remain meaningful. Under my approach, those limits are contiguous with the estrangement and alienation of Indigenous peoples from
the Canadian administrative state.

B. Level One: Penalty
The first and least controversial level at which Gladue principles can
apply is penalty: Gladue principles can apply to increase the threshold for
a penalty to be applied, decrease a penalty, or substitute alternative penalties—with a broad conception of “penalty.” Indeed, penalty—in its myriad forms—is directly analogous to criminal sentencing itself. As the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in Ipeelee, section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code is necessary to achieve the predominant sentencing principle of
proportionality by properly assessing a person’s “moral blameworthiness.”136 To the extent that moral blameworthiness is at least partially
relevant to penalty determinations outside criminal sentencing, Gladue
principles serve the same function as section 718.2(e) itself.
This level neatly connects the existing extensions of Gladue principles
in administrative law as discussed in Part II. At first glance, most of
these existing extensions of Gladue principles appear to be about liberty.
However, Moore suggests that these are better understood as being about

134

See AD-S v NMN, 2020 CanLII 67103 especially at paras 34–35 (Ont HPARB). Thank
you to a reviewer for bringing this decision to my attention. But see SP v JVF, 2020
CanLII 26459 at para 43 (Ont HPARB).

135

See Robinson, supra note 24 (“[c]riminal sentencing judges will apply the Gladue principles in different ways than hearing panels. After all, they have different tools available to them, as well as a different range of sanctions, including imprisonment. But that
simply explains why the Gladue principles may be applied differently in discipline proceedings than in criminal proceedings. The principles still apply” at para 74).

136

Ipeelee, supra note 4 at 37, 73. See also Rudin, supra note 6 at 377–78.

THE APPLICATION OF GLADUE PRINCIPLES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 367

a penalty for wrongful or undesirable or otherwise problematic conduct.137
Such a characterization should be interpreted generously and beyond
these existing extensions of Gladue principles. For example, the eviction
in Re Can-Am and the compensation refusal in Desmoulin were, despite
their characterization in the respective reasons as non-criminal matters,
fundamentally about consequences for criminal conduct. For that matter,
so were the disciplinary decision in Robinson and the termination in
Muskrat Falls.
Indeed, characterizing liberty as the unifying determinative factor
among these cases as to whether Gladue principles apply is problematic
given DB (Re). Involuntary treatment unquestionably engages the liberty
interest, as well as the security of the person and potentially life where
the treatment is dangerous. Nonetheless, Gladue principles were not extended to this context—perhaps because compulsory treatment is not a
penalty, and thus it sits awkwardly with the existing precedents.
Similarly, the language in decisions such as Leonard—that “the
Gladue factors are not limited to criminal sentencing but that they should
be considered by all ‘decision-makers who have the power to influence the
treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice system’ ... whenever an
Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and related proceedings” 138—is not necessarily limiting. This language, while reinforcing that
Gladue principles apply in “criminal and related proceedings,” leaves “related proceedings” undefined. Moreover, it cannot preclude the extension
of these principles beyond these boundaries.139
While Robinson and Ross might suggest that Gladue principles apply
to professional discipline in only some contexts, I argue that, as in
Nahdee, those principles apply to any disciplinary penalty imposed on
any Indigenous professional. Robinson and Ross were about disciplinary
penalties for professions intricately linked to the justice system (lawyers
and police, respectively), and Robinson was about disciplinary consequences for criminal conduct. Thus, they might support a conception of
Gladue principles that applies only where alienation and estrangement
from the justice system is directly relevant. However, under my broader
approach, where Gladue principles apply to alienation and estrangement
not just from the justice system but also from the administrative state it137
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self, these are not limiting factors. In this spirit, consequences such as an
eviction, an employment termination, and a denial of compensation for
victims of crime would all qualify as penalties even if the underlying conduct was not criminal.
Under this approach, Gladue principles properly apply to mitigate
penalties in decisions such as those discussed above—eviction (Re CanAm), compensation (Desmoulin), and employment termination (Muskrat
Falls), as well as professional discipline (Robinson and Nahdee).
Moreover, using alienation and estrangement from the administrative
state as the test, Gladue principles would also apply to costs orders
against Indigenous persons in administrative proceedings.140 I have argued elsewhere that costs orders in disciplinary proceedings against Indigenous professionals do not invoke alienation and estrangement from
the justice system in the same way as disciplinary penalties themselves.141 Therefore, using that as the test for the scope of Gladue principles, it is unclear whether those principles apply to costs orders.142 However, costs orders are a fundamental aspect of the administrative state.
Gladue principles should thus apply in costs contexts.
I acknowledge here that the application of Gladue principles is more
contestable in contexts such as Lewis where an Indigenous person is not
the subject of the penalty decision, but will be directly affected by that decision. The less direct the effect, the less obvious the application of Gladue
principles.

C. Level Two: Benefit
Outside of proceedings which involve the imposition of penalties for
unlawful or otherwise problematic conduct, existing extensions of Gladue
principles are uninformative and it remains unclear how Gladue principles should affect outcomes in administrative decisions.
I argue that a second level at which Gladue principles should apply in
administrative law is in relation to a benefit. As a parallel or converse to
penalty, Gladue principles can apply to decrease the threshold for provision of a benefit or to increase a benefit. Penalty and benefit are linked
and the line between them is not always clear. For example, the applicant
in Desmoulin was seeking a benefit but was denied compensation essentially as a penalty for his subsequent conduct. It would be arbitrary and
140
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unprincipled for the application and impact of Gladue principles to be
contingent on a fuzzy and manipulatable distinction between penalty and
benefit.
From the cases reviewed in Parts II and III, it seems that the legal
criteria for a penalty tend to be more open-ended and thus more amenable to the consideration of Gladue principles than the legal criteria for a
benefit, which tend to be specified in statute and closed. Recall here that
Gladue principles did not apply in the legal aid and disability support decisions mentioned above, because of the language of the relevant statutes.
However, there are benefit contexts—such as victims’ compensation in
Desmoulin—in which open-ended statutory criteria could allow Gladue
principles to be incorporated. 143 Legislative amendments allowing decision-makers to apply an open-ended list of considerations would increase
the potential for Gladue principles to be applied in this “benefit” level of
decisions.
As with penalty, I argue that Gladue principles are not just applicable
where alienation and estrangement from the justice system is relevant,
such as the legal aid benefits at issue in Anonyme. Instead, they are applicable to any administrative decision on benefits because their applicability stems from alienation and estrangement from the colonial administrative state itself.
At the same time, I acknowledge the argument that the extension of
Gladue principles beyond sentencing-like contexts distorts or at least dilutes their meaning. That is, the extension either introduces a concept
originated in criminal law to contexts with no relation to criminal law, or
it disconnects the principles from their roots such that they retain no inherent meaning. Nonetheless, on balance, I believe that these extensions
of Gladue principles remain firmly anchored in the alienation and estrangement of Indigenous peoples and thus retain a clear and meaningful
content and function as a common law legal concept—even when they go
beyond penalty.

D. Level Three: Residual (Neither Penalty Nor Benefit)
The two levels of penalty and benefit will encompass the majority of
administrative law proceedings. But there will be some that remain, and
these I identify as being a third residual level that is neither penalty nor
143

See Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, RSO 1990, c C.24 [CVCA] (“In determining
whether to make an order for compensation and the amount thereof, the Board shall
have regard to all relevant circumstances, including any behaviour of the victim that
may have directly or indirectly contributed to his or her injury or death”, s 17(1)); Desmoulin, supra note 50 at paras 29–31.
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benefit. The best example of this level is consent and capacity to medical
treatment, as in DB (Re).
The capacity and consent context is difficult because, unlike the other
kinds of decisions that I have considered, it is not about the imposition of
a penalty (such as professional discipline or an eviction) or the provision
of a benefit (such as social assistance, legal aid, or compensation for victims of crime). While involuntary treatment may surely seem like a penalty to a patient, that perspective is instructive but incomplete and not
determinative. Unlike a penalty or a benefit, it is not obvious how the test
for capacity could incorporate a patient’s Indigeneity. It is in such contexts, even more so than in penalty or benefit determinations, that a careful examination of the historical and social context will be particularly
necessary. Counsel’s submissions would likewise need to be both creative
and responsive by considering how alienation and estrangement of Indigenous peoples from the administrative state, and pervasive bias against
Indigenous peoples within the administrative state, manifest in the specific context and how they can best be acknowledged and counteracted.
Given the history of involuntary treatment and experimentation on
Indigenous persons in Canada,144 especially within the context of discriminatory healthcare in residential schools as documented by the TRC,145 a
higher evidentiary and legal threshold could be warranted. However, insofar as involuntary treatment is indeed for the protection and the benefit
of the individual in question—a loaded question well beyond the scope of
this paper—a higher threshold is not in the interests of patients generally. Moreover, to the extent that involuntary treatment is in the public interest, a higher threshold is at some level contrary to that public interest.
Any such changes would require legislative amendment.
What other kinds of decisions would fit within this residual level?
Consent and capacity for medical treatment may well be unique. Recall
however the motion to vary child support in Armstrong.146 While outside
144
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administrative law, child support is an example of a duty or an obligation
that is not “punitive,”147 that is, it is perhaps not properly understood as a
penalty.
Legislative guidance will be appropriate and sometimes necessary in
these residual contexts to indicate how Gladue principles apply and how
this difficult balance should be struck.

V. Gladue By Any Other Name?
There is an important caveat to my analysis in the previous Parts.
The fact that a decision-maker or court explicitly declines to apply Gladue
principles, or that Gladue principles are not explicitly invoked, does not
necessarily mean that Gladue-like considerations are not being applied.
For example, the Divisional Court in Desmoulin, after holding that
Gladue principles did not apply, nevertheless held that the board had
properly considered the applicant’s Indigeneity:
This is not to say that the Board should not consider the impact of
the cultural background and travails of our aboriginal population in
considering the role that a criminal record should play in undertaking the balance outlined in s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims
of Crime Act or that the Board failed to do so in this case. ... In any
event, the Board was aware of [the] cultural background of Frank
Desmoulin.148

Similarly, while the applicant in Sheck framed his argument in Gladue
principles,149 the majority in Sheck observed that “one has to appreciate the
same historical context that underlies the Gladue factors” 150 —seemingly
suggesting that Gladue principles themselves might not be strictly applicable. Does the terminology used, and the Desmoulin distinction between
criminal-related and non-criminal-related matters, make a difference?
Likewise, consider the reasons of the British Columbia Supreme
Court in Inglis v. British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety).151 Inglis,
although framed as a Charter action, was essentially a judicial review of
the cancellation of a program that allowed mothers in provincial jails,
many of them Indigenous, to keep their babies with them.152 The court in
147
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Inglis relied on Gladue itself only to establish that Indigenous persons are
a historically disadvantaged (and overincarcerated) group for the purpose
of an analysis under section 15 of the Charter.153 However, the decision at
issue in Inglis, in its application to Indigenous inmates, could likely have
been characterized as unreasonable under Gladue principles absent
Charter arguments.
At a substantive level, the importance is in the considerations applied
and not in the terminology used. At the same time, Gladue has become a
helpful shorthand for a complex problem and a family of approaches to
that complex problem.154 Courts on judicial review should ask whether
Gladue principles have been substantively applied, whether or not they
are explicitly accepted or rejected—or even explicitly mentioned—by
name. However, the explicit mention of Gladue principles, and their purported application or rejection, will be a helpful indicator to courts. As in
Robinson, Gladue principles can be applied in different ways in different
contexts. The adoption of Gladue terminology does not, and should not,
require that the underlying principles are being applied in the same way
as in criminal sentencing.
The question of whether extending Gladue principles beyond penalty
erodes their meaning and functionality is, at one level, a question of terminology. We could alternatively substitute another term for Gladue
principles in benefit determination—for example, Desmoulin principles—
and another term in residual contexts. These would remain, however, a
family of principles related by their anchors in Indigenous alienation and
estrangement. Retaining them as Gladue principles emphasizes that alienation and estrangement, rather than the criminal justice context.

VI. Standard of Review
Given the three levels I have identified in which Gladue principles can
apply, what is the standard of review a court will use to assess such decisions?
Following the recent restatement of the standard of review analysis
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
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Immigration) v. Vavilov,155 whether Gladue principles are applicable is a
question of law that will be reviewable on a standard of reasonableness—
except if there is a statutory right of appeal, in which case the standard of
review will be correctness.156 The application of Gladue principles to the
individual circumstances of a particular decision will be a question of
mixed fact and law for which the standard of review will be reasonableness. Again, the question is not whether the decision-maker mentioned or
rejected Gladue by name,157 but whether substantive Gladue principles
were applied.
The majority in Vavilov established “a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard whenever a court reviews administrative
decisions.”158 That presumption is rebuttable where the legislation states
otherwise, either explicitly or by creating an appeal to a court, and “where
the rule of law requires that the standard of correctness be applied[:] ...
constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to
the legal system as a whole and questions related to the jurisdictional
boundaries between two or more administrative bodies.”159
Gladue principles, despite their extension over time, remain—at least
at present—a common law principle and not a constitutional principle.
Whether or not they properly apply in a specific context is neither a constitutional question, a question of central importance to the legal system,
nor a question about jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, the reasonableness
presumption of Vavilov is not rebutted.
Naiomi Metallic has argued that deference in administrative law reinforces statutory and policy regimes that do not recognize the interests of
Indigenous peoples.160 Arguably, a reasonableness standard for the review
of the decision to apply Gladue principles is problematic for similar reasons.
Nonetheless, under my analysis, given the ever-present alienation and
estrangement of Indigenous peoples from the administrative state, it will
almost always be unreasonable to fail to consider applying Gladue principles, and it will generally be unreasonable to decline to apply Gladue
155
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principles, where the person who is the subject of the decision is Indigenous and the enabling statute does not preclude their application. Where
the person who is the subject of the decision is not Indigenous, but an Indigenous person is directly affected by the decision, it may be unreasonable to fail or decline to apply Gladue principles. However, it is not necessarily unreasonable for a decision-maker to apply Gladue principles but
determine that they do not affect the result in the particular matter.

VII. Recommendations
The above analysis supports the following recommendations for counsel, administrative decision-makers, and judges on judicial review. There
is also an important role for legislators and executive authorities.
Administrative decision-makers should consider Gladue principles in
any decision about the interests of an Indigenous person, particularly
where that person is not represented by counsel. It will be important to
invite the person or their counsel to identify what the effect of Gladue
principles should be, especially where the decision is not about a penalty
or a benefit and thus falls into my third or “residual” level. Judges on judicial review of any decision about the interests of an Indigenous person
should likewise invite submissions on how Gladue principles should apply. Moreover, where declining to apply Gladue principles, decisionmakers and reviewing judges should resist the conclusory assertion that
the context of the decision is too different from criminal sentencing. And
with respect to Justice Watchuk in Moore, the absence of an exact precedent should not be given excessive weight; decision-makers and judges
should be open to incrementally extending Gladue principles to new situations as they would for any other common law doctrine. Moreover, given
the potential for judicial review of an administrative decision, or an appeal of a judicial review, both administrative decision-makers and judges
would be wise to address Gladue principles in the alternative even when
doing so is strictly unnecessary to decide the matter.
Counsel should argue Gladue principles in any decision about the interests of an Indigenous person and any judicial review of such a decision—but they should demonstrate clearly in their submissions how
Gladue principles would apply and how their application would change
the result. Where the decision is about a benefit or penalty, Gladue principles may lower the threshold for a benefit or increase a benefit, or increase the threshold for a penalty or decrease a penalty, if the relevant
statutory framework allows it. However, where the decision is not about a
benefit or penalty, the potential role for Gladue principles is unclear and
particular creativity and responsiveness by counsel will be necessary.
More specifically, counsel should carefully consider how the alienation
and estrangement of Indigenous peoples from the administrative state, as
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well as the pervasive bias against Indigenous peoples within the administrative state, are manifested in the specific context, and how that alienation and bias can best be acknowledged and counteracted. As a foundation
for these arguments, and particularly to the extent that there remains
uncertainty over the proper scope of judicial notice and the need for specific evidence about the circumstances of the particular Indigenous person
who is the subject of the decision, counsel should introduce such evidence
where available.
Moreover, Gladue principles might properly apply when the decision
directly affects the interests of an Indigenous person who is not a party,
or the interests of that party are a relevant consideration, such as the Indigenous child of the non-Indigenous parent whose deportation was at
stake in Lewis. Decision-makers, judges, and counsel must turn their
minds to remoteness here.
Parliament and the legislatures should carefully consider whether
Gladue principles are relevant to each of the administrative decisionmakers that operate under their statutory authority and, if so, then
amend the enabling statutes to allow—or, better, require—Gladue principles to be considered and specify how they apply. This will be most important in contexts where enabling statutes implicitly disallow the consideration of Gladue principles. Likewise, executive authorities should
ensure that regulations and substatutory guidance for decision-makers
take Gladue principles into account.

Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that there is a role, indeed a powerful
role, for Gladue principles in administrative law. By discarding the anemic view that Gladue principles are solely a statutory principle, and by
recognizing a legitimate ability, if not a duty, of administrative decisionmakers to engage in incremental but creative extension of those principles to new contexts, administrative law can be transformed from a barrier into a gateway toward reconciliation. While I certainly do not argue
that Gladue principles are a panacea for reconciliation, they are nonetheless a feasible component that does not require wholesale redesign of the
legal system, just a re-energization of traditional legal creativity. Indeed,
the omission of Gladue principles from administrative law—in fact, anything other than their zealous adoption—hamstrings those principles’
ability to achieve their intended purposes across a wide swath of the legal
system and the administrative state.
True and successful reconciliation requires, among other things, the
acknowledgement of the estrangement and alienation of Indigenous peoples not only from the colonial Canadian criminal justice system or the
justice system more broadly, but also from the colonial Canadian admin-
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istrative state itself. In terms of the conception of reconciliation adopted
by the TRC, the administrative state must respectfully—and thus, honestly and deliberately—engage with the unique circumstances of Indigenous persons. As the TRC put it: “Reconciliation is not an Aboriginal
problem; it is a Canadian one.”161 It is in this respect that the proper application of Gladue principles in administrative law is essential. This application, particularly in decisions that are not about penalties or benefits, will require creativity and responsiveness not only from counsel but
also from administrative decision-makers, reviewing courts, and even legislatures and executive authorities themselves. While it is easy to blame
decision-makers for rejecting Gladue principles out of hand, as demonstrated for example in Re Can-Am, counsel share an obligation to help illustrate how those principles properly apply in specific circumstances,
particularly where there is no exact precedent on which to rely.
While the standard of review for failing to consider or declining to apply Gladue principles will be reasonableness, such failure to do so will
rarely be reasonable, particularly if the decision under review concerns a
benefit or a penalty for an Indigenous person—assuming the enabling
statute does not preclude their application.
Indeed, I emphasize in closing that legislators have a critical role in
ensuring that enabling statutes do not inadvertently or covertly preclude
the application of Gladue principles. As I have demonstrated above, this
tends to be true where a benefit is at issue. Some legislation will need to
be amended, whether merely to allow decision-makers to consider all relevant factors or ideally to specifically direct them to consider Gladue
principles where applicable. There is an immediacy and urgency to this
legislative project. Going forward, legislative counsel should add Gladue
principles to the parameters they establish when receiving drafting instructions.
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